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SELF-CANCELLING INSTALLMENT NOTES
— by Neil E. Harl*
Until 1980, it was generally believed
that an installment contract set up with
remaining payments cancelled after the
death of the contract seller would be treated
as a transfer with a retained life estate.1
That was sufficient to discourage use of
such a concept.
In the 1980 Tax Court case of Estate of
Moss,2 the remaining balance due under an
installment note (which was cancelled at
death) was not includible in the transferor's
gross estate.  That case cleared the way for
development of the self-cancelling
installment note (SCIN).  It was not until
1986, however, when IRS released a
General Counsel's Memorandum3 and a
revenue ruling4 that the SCIN came to be
viewed as a viable estate planning and
retirement planning concept.5
Principles for characterizing
transactions.  SCINs bear some resem-
blance to installment sale obligations,6
used widely for the sale of farmland, and
some resemblance to private annuities.7
Therefore, one of the important planning
features of using SCINs is to distinguish
among the three concepts in setting up the
transaction.  IRS has provided principles
for characterizing transactions as SCINs,
installment obligations or private annu-
ities.
•  If the transferor receives a right to
periodic  payments  for  the remainder of
the transferor's life, with no monetary
limit imposed, the transaction should be
characterized as a private annuity.
Example (1):  X transfers farmland
to  Y  in  return  for  Y's  promise  to
*
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make annual payments of $15,000 to
X until X's death. The transaction is
properly a private annuity.
•  If the terms of the transaction provide
for a stated maximum payment that will be
achieved in a period less than the
transferor's life expectancy, the transaction
should be characterized as an installment
sale.8
Example (2):  X transfers farmland
to Y in exchange for Y's promise to
make annual payments of $15,000 to
X until $150,000 is paid or until X's
death, whichever occurs first.  X's life
expectancy at the time of transfer is
11 years.  The transaction should be
treated as an installment sale with a
SCIN provision.
•  If the life expectancy of the transferor
is equal to or less than the maximum
payment period, the transaction should be
treated as a private annuity.
Example (3):  X transfers farmland
to Y in exchange for Y's promise to
make annual payments of $15,000 to
X until $150,000 is paid or until X's
death, whichever occurs first.  X's life
expectancy at the time of the transfer
is 9.1 years.  The transaction should
be characterized as a private annuity.
Tax consequences.  As noted
above,9 the value of an obligation can-
celled at death under a SCIN characteriza-
tion is not included in the gross estate.
For federal gift tax purposes, a gift
could arise if the SCIN transaction fails to
include an appropriate premium (in terms
of principal payment or interest rate)
because the seller may not collect the full
amount of the principal due under the
transaction.  No objective guidelines have
been provided for establishing the magni-
tude of the premium.  The premium
amount should relate to the relationship of
the seller's life expectancy to the term of
the obligation and the amount of principal
involved.  A gift could also occur if the
stated interest rate is excessive (gift to the
transferor) or insufficient (gift to the trans-
feree).10  The IRS position has been that
utilization of an interest rate below the
market rate for installment obligations
produces a gift as to the present value of
the difference even though the rate of inter-
est actually used is acceptable for federal
income tax purposes.11  Some courts have
agreed,12 although the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeal in 1988 held that purchase
of property with the interest rate set below
the market rate of interest was not a gift
where the transaction was acceptable from
an income tax perspective.13  In a 1990
case,14 the Tax Court has once again
upheld the IRS position in finding a gift in
a family transaction where the interest rate
used was below a market rate.  Thus,
outside the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals area, the IRS position is still an
important consideration.
For federal income tax purposes in
dealing with SCINs, the major concern is
that the deferred gain which is cancelled at
death must be recognized on the seller's
estate's initial income tax return.15  Some
commentators have argued that the deferred
gain should be recognized on the decedent's
final return.16
For income tax reporting purposes, a
SCIN is treated as a contingent installment
sale with gain calculated under the assump-
tion the maximum stated selling price will
be received by the seller.17  Each payment
is divided into return of basis, gain and
interest income.18  Apparently, the full
face value of the SCIN is included in the
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buyer's income tax basis for the property
even though a part of that amount may be
cancelled in the event of the seller's death.
It appears that a SCIN is subject to the
usual unstated interest rules (and original
issue discount provisions where applica-
ble)19 although that is not completely
clear.  Apparently, the buyer does not have
discharge of indebtedness income from
cancellation of the remainder of the obliga-
tion at the death of the seller.20  It would
appear that SCIN transactions could be
subject to the penalties for valuation over-
statement (more than 150 percent over the
correct amount).21
Conclusion .  Self-cancelling in-
stallment notes may be preferred over
private annuities, primarily because the
seller can retain a security interest in the
property conveyed.  With private annuities,
retention of a security interest causes the
transaction to be treated as a sale.22  That
is not a problem with SCINs; security
interests can be retained in the same
manner as with installment sales.
Another advantage is that the buyer
under a SCIN is entitled to an interest
deduction; an obligor may not claim an
income tax deduction for interest in a
private annuity.23
Finally, in the event of default by the
purchaser, a seller under a SCIN can repos-
sess the property under the special relief
provisions of I.R.C. § 1038.  Such is not
possible with a private annuity because the
property does not stand as collateral for the
debt obligation as is required.24  Therefore,
reconveyance of property by the obligor
under a private annuity to the annuitant
does not appear to come within the relief
provisions of I.R.C. § 1038.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANIMALS
CATTLE.  The defendant had bor-
rowed a bull for breeding and had placed the
bull in a fenced area.  The bull escaped
from the fenced area into another pasture
which was similarly fenced.  The defendant
did not capture the bull and place it back in
the original fenced area and the bull escaped
from the pasture.  The bull was later
captured in a fenced in state park by park
rangers but the bull escaped again and
caused an accident with a truck owned by
the plaintiff.  The court denied summary
judgment for the defendant and held that
actions of the state park rangers was not a
sufficient intervening cause by law to
absolve the defendant of any negligence
which a jury may find.  T. M. Doyle
Teaming Co., Inc. v. Freels, 7 3 5
F.Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
HORSES .  A summary judgment for
the defendant was upheld in an action
involving injuries received by the plaintiff
when a horse provided to the plaintiff by
the defendant fell while the plaintiff was
riding it.  The court held that the plaintiff
failed to allege any specific evidence as to
the cause of the horse's fall other than to
allege that the horse was sick.  The court
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
by itself was insufficient because the
